mailing address: by Jan De Houwer & Jan De Houwer
 
 
1
 
RUNNING HEAD: Evaluative Conditioning 
 
 
 
 
Evaluative Conditioning:  
A review of procedure knowledge and mental process theories 
  
  
  Jan De Houwer 
  Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To appear in T. R. Schachtman & S. Reilly. Applications of learning and conditioning. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  Final version, 14 August 2009 
 
mailing address:    Jan De Houwer 
Ghent University 
Henri Dunantlaan 2 
B-9000 Ghent 
Belgium 
email: Jan.DeHouwer@UGent.be 
 
phone: 0032 9 264 64 45 
fax: 0032 9 264 64 89  Evaluative  Conditioning 
 
2
 
Evaluative Conditioning:  
A review of procedure knowledge and mental process theories 
Applying Pavlovian conditioning to a phenomenon in daily life always boils down to 
the following question: Does the phenomenon qualify as an instance of Pavlovian 
conditioning? As is evidenced by different chapters in this book, many phenomena have been 
considered as instances of Pavlovian conditioning. In the present chapter, I examine whether 
changes in liking can also be understood from this perspective. Before I review the evidence 
on this topic, I first consider in more detail the meaning of the term “Pavlovian conditioning” 
because this determines what phenomena can be seen as instances of Pavlovian conditioning 
and thus how Pavlovian conditioning can be applied.  
What is Pavlovian conditioning? 
In some textbooks, Pavlovian conditioning is defined in a very narrow manner as the 
unconscious formation of associations that results from the pairing of a conditioned stimulus 
(CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US) and that leads to changes in physiological 
responses (e.g., salivation) (e.g., Arnould, Price, & Zinkhan, 2004; Evans, Jamal, & Foxall, 
2006). Such a definition is narrow in that it limits conditioning to changes in one particular 
class of responses that are due to one particular type of mental process. Other researchers 
impose other restrictions on the definition of Pavlovian conditioning, for instance, when 
arguing that “true” Pavlovian conditioning always involves biologically relevant USs (e.g., 
Miller & Matute, 1996). In this section, I will argue that it makes more sense to define 
Pavlovian conditioning in broadest possible manner, that is, as a change in behavior that is 
due to the pairing of stimuli. Imposing restrictions on the nature of the changes, the nature of 
the responses, the nature of the stimuli, or the nature of the underlying mental processes is  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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unnecessary and can lead to deleterious effects (see De Houwer, 2007, 2009, for an in depth 
discussion). 
Let us consider the necessity of restrictions regarding the nature of the responses. 
There is no a priori reason why only changes in one type of responses (e.g., physiological 
responses) should be considered as possible instances of Pavlovian conditioning. It is true 
that Pavlov’s (1927) seminal studies focused on changes in a physiological response 
(salivation) but since then many studies on Pavlovian conditioning have looked at changes in 
other types of behavior. For example, in studies on autoshaping, food is presented to pigeons 
each time a key lights up. As a result of this contingency, the pigeons start pecking the key 
(e.g., Brown & Jenkins, 1968). There is no logical reason why a change in salivation could 
count as Pavlovian conditioning but a change in key pecking could not. More generally, there 
is no logical reason why any type of response should be excluded on an a priori basis from 
the realm of Pavlovian conditioning (Eelen, 1980). 
There is also no a priori reason why Pavlovian conditioning should be restricted to 
changes in behavior that are due to a particular process like the (unconscious) formation of 
associations in memory. It is true that some researchers (used to) believe that conditioned 
changes in behavior are due to the unconscious formation of associations (e.g., Thorndike, 
1911; Watson, 1913). But this was simply one possible theory about the processes that 
produce conditioning effects. There are also other theories of classical conditioning 
according to which the formation of associations does depend on awareness (e.g., Dawson & 
Schell, 1987) or that do not refer to the formation of associations at all. For instance, 
Mitchell, De Houwer, and Lovibond (2009a) have argued that Pavlovian conditioning results 
from the conscious formation and evaluation of propositions about CS-US relations. Why 
should some theories be dismissed on an a priori basis?  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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In addition to the fact that there are no good reasons to limit Pavlovian conditioning 
to only a subset of effects of the pairing of stimuli, doing so can have several deleterious 
consequences (see De Houwer, 2007). First, it could prevent researchers from acknowledging 
and studying the similarities and differences between different effects of stimulus pairings. 
The mere fact of using different labels for different effects can draw attention away from 
similarities in the conditions under which the effects occur. Moreover, knowledge about the 
similarities and differences between different effects of stimulus pairings can provide crucial 
information about the processes by which the pairing of stimuli influences behavior. Second, 
defining Pavlovian conditioning in terms of particular processes hampers the study of 
conditioning because a particular change in behavior can be considered as an instance of 
conditioning only when it can be established that it is produced by certain processes. This is 
problematic because it is often extremely difficult to determine whether a particular process 
is responsible for a certain change in behavior. The same problem arises with other criteria 
that are difficult to verify (e.g., whether stimuli are biologically relevant). Finally, a 
definition of Pavlovian conditioning in terms of mental processes holds the risk that doubts 
about the role of those mental processes lead to doubts about the existence of Pavlovian 
conditioning effects (Eelen, 1980). For instance, the downfall of behaviorist theories of 
conditioning led to a dramatic slowdown in research on conditioning effects because many 
researchers inferred that humans do not show “true” Pavlovian conditioning effects (i.e., 
effects that are due to unconscious association formation; e.g., Brewer, 1974). More 
generally, defining effects in terms of processes violates the scientific principle that theories 
(i.e., the explanans) need to be separated from the effects that they aim to explain (i.e., the 
explanandum).  
Because of these reasons, I prefer to define Pavlovian conditioning as a change in  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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behavior that results from the pairing of stimuli. The only criterion that is left for labeling a 
change in behavior as an instance of Pavlovian conditioning is that the change is due to the 
pairing of stimuli rather than other factors such as genetic makeup (e.g., changes in behavior 
due to maturation), the simple repeated experience of a stimulus (e.g., habituation) or the 
relation between a behavior and a stimulus (e.g., operant conditioning; De Houwer, 2009). In 
laboratory situations, this criterion can be verified by implementing appropriate control 
conditions (e.g., by presenting stimuli in an unpaired manner). Although it might not always 
be easy to determine the environmental cause of a change in behavior, applying the minimal 
definition of Pavlovian conditioning will always be more straightforward than applying other 
definitions in which other criteria are added to the minimal definition (e.g., criteria regarding 
the nature of the response, the nature of the US, or the type of underlying process).  
Some readers might not be willing to accept this minimal definition, perhaps because 
of historical reasons. All definitions are subject to matters of convention and everyone is thus 
free to add criteria to the minimal definition. If one chooses to do so, it should, however, be 
made explicit what the additional criteria are, why those criteria are thought to be crucial, and 
how it can be verified whether a certain effect of stimulus pairings meets those criteria. One 
should also be aware of and be willing to accept the limitations that such additional criteria 
impose on Pavlovian conditioning research. I prefer the minimal definition because it 
maximizes the scope of Pavlovian conditioning research, because it is logically coherent, and 
because it is the easiest to verify.  
What is Evaluative Conditioning and How Can We Study it? 
Adopting a minimal definition of Pavlovian conditioning allows one to fully engage 
in the question of whether certain changes in liking are instances of Pavlovian conditioning. 
The only criterion that needs to be satisfied in order to categorize a change in liking as an  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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instance of Pavlovian conditioning is that the change is due to a relation between stimuli 
rather than to other environmental factors such as the simple repeated presentation of a single 
stimulus (as is the case in mere exposure effects, see Bornstein, 1989). A change in liking 
that is due to the pairing of stimuli is typically referred to as an evaluative conditioning (EC) 
effect (Levey & Martin, 1975; De Houwer, 2007). EC effects are thus a subset of Pavlovian 
conditioning effects, the only distinction being that EC effects always involve changes in 
liking whereas Pavlovian conditioning effects can relate to a change in any type of 
observable response. The procedures that are used to study evaluative conditioning are also 
very similar to the procedures that are used to study other forms of Pavlovian conditioning: 
Stimuli are paired in a certain way under certain conditions. The only systematic difference 
between EC procedures and other Pavlovian conditioning procedures is that all EC 
procedures measure on changes in liking (De Houwer, 2007).  
As is the case with other instances of Pavlovian conditioning (and thus all possible 
applications of Pavlovian conditioning), several questions can be raised regarding EC (De 
Houwer, 2009). A first question concerns the procedural conditions under which the pairing 
of stimuli results in changes in liking. These conditions refer either to the abstract nature of 
the relation between stimuli or to the concrete way in which the relation is implemented. The 
abstract nature of the relation refers to the statistical properties of the relation between stimuli 
(e.g., contiguity, contingency) and possible changes in those properties (e.g., extinction). 
Studies that examine the impact of these procedural features inform us about which aspects 
of the relation are crucial in establishing EC. The concrete implementation of the relation 
requires choices regarding the stimuli that are presented, the type of liking response that is 
observed, the organism that experiences the relation, the context in which the relation 
present, and the way in which information about the relation is communicated.   Evaluative  Conditioning 
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By manipulating each of these procedural elements, knowledge can be gained about 
those aspects of the procedure or environment that determine whether and to what extent a 
relation between stimuli influences the liking of those stimuli. I will refer to this knowledge 
as procedure knowledge. Note that procedure knowledge about EC goes beyond mere 
empirical knowledge. First, it involves more than the description of an event in that it offers 
hypotheses about which elements in the procedure are assumed to exert an impact on 
behavior. Like all hypotheses, procedure knowledge needs to be backed up by (empirical and 
logical) arguments. For instance, the empirical observation that the liking of a particular CS 
changes after it has been paired 10 times with a particular US can be explained in terms of 
the mere co-occurrence of the CS and US or in terms of the positive statistical contingency 
between the CS and US (i.e., the fact that the CS and US often co-occur and never occur 
separately). Which procedural explanation is correct, needs to be determined on the basis of 
additional research (e.g., by manipulating the number of CS-only and US-only trials). 
Second, procedure knowledge goes beyond the individual event in that hypotheses about the 
role of procedural elements are thought to be valid in more than one situation. For instance, 
the hypothesis that CS-US co-occurrences are sufficient for EC is thought to be true not only 
for one particular CS-US pair in one specific context. Procedure knowledge is therefore more 
than a collection of empirical findings (see De Houwer, 2009). 
The second question that can be raised regarding EC concerns the nature of the 
mental processes that are responsible for EC. Theories about the mental processes that 
underlie EC aim to explain procedure knowledge about EC, that is, why certain aspects of the 
EC procedure determine the magnitude and direction of EC effects. For instance, some 
mental process models predict that EC will depend primarily on the number of CS-US co-
occurrences whereas other mental process models predict that the statistical contingency is  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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important (i.e., that also the number of CS-only and US-only trials count). The merits of 
different mental process theories can be evaluated by examining (a) how well they can 
account for the available procedure knowledge (i.e., the heuristic function of process 
theories) and (b) the extent to which they predict novel procedure knowledge (i.e., the 
predictive function of process theories). 
In the remainder of this chapter, I use this framework to review the literature on EC 
(see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001, and Field, 2005, for other reviews). The first 
section summarizes findings regarding the effects of the abstract nature of the relation and the 
concrete implementation of the relation. The second section provides an overview of mental 
process theories of EC. The review is not intended to be exhaustive in the sense that all 
relevant studies will be discussed or even cited. I will, however, attempt to present a 
summary of what I believe to be the main findings and insights that are currently available in 
the literature on EC.  
Procedure Knowledge 
The Abstract Nature of the Relation 
The statistical properties of the CS-US relation.  
The presence of stimuli can be related in many different ways. Therefore, the value of the 
claim that a change in behavior is due to a CS-US relation depends heavily on how much is 
known about the exact properties of the CS-US relation that determine its effect on behavior. 
We will consider three statistical properties of the CS-US relation: Co-occurrence, 
contingency, and redundancy.  
Co-occurrence. Several studies suggest that EC becomes stronger as the number of 
CS-US pairings increases, that is, the more often the CS and US co-occur in space and time 
(e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992a; Bar-Anan, De Houwer, & Nosek,  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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2009). However, after more than 10 pairings, there is no further increase (Bar-Anan et al., 
2009) or even a slight decrease in EC (Baeyens et al., 1992a). Although co-occurrence is 
important, it is not a necessary condition for EC. EC can occur even when the CS and US 
have never co-occurred but are related in an indirect manner through co-occurrences with a 
third stimulus. In a seminal study on this topic, Hammerl and Grabitz (1996) first presented 
pairs of neutral stimuli (e.g., A-B). Afterwards, one of the stimuli of each pair was presented 
together with a US (e.g., B-US). During a test phase, it was found that the latter pairings 
changed not only the liking of the CS that was paired with the US (e.g., B) but also the liking 
of the other neutral stimulus (e.g., A). This effect, which is known as sensory pre-
conditioning, has been replicated and examined in more detail by Walther (2002).  
  Contingency. Baeyens, Hermans, and Eelen (1993) examined the impact of the 
statistical contingency between the CS and the US by intermixing CS-US trials with trials on 
which only the CS or only the US occurred. Unlike what is typically found in Pavlovian 
conditioning research, the magnitude of EC was not affected by the number of trials on which 
only the CS or only the US was presented. However, the failure of Baeyens et al. to find an 
impact of contingency might have been due to the low power of their statistical tests. More 
research on this issue is thus needed.  
 
Redundancy. A relation between a CS and a US can also be described in terms of its 
redundancy, that is, the extent to which the CS-US relation overlaps with other CS-US 
relations. We know of only two studies that looked at the impact of the redundancy of the 
CS-US relation on EC. The relation between a CS A and the US can be described as 
redundant when CS A always co-occurs together with a second CS B that also co-occurs with 
the US. Dwyer, Jarratt, and Dick (2007) found that the change in liking of A was as large  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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after A-US pairings (i.e., A+ trials) as after AB-US pairings (i.e., AB+ trials). That is, they 
failed to observe an overshadowing effect. Lipp, Neumann, and Mason (2001) on the other 
hand, observed a bigger change in liking of A when the A-US relation was redundant (i.e., 
after AB+ and B+ trials) than when the A-US relation was not redundant (i.e., after AB+ and 
B- trials). Again, more research on this topic is needed before clear conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the impact of redundancy on EC.  
Changes in the statistical properties of the CS-US relation.  
The relation between a CS and US does not necessarily remain stable over context or time. 
The presence of a CS-US relation can be preceded or followed by the absence of the same 
relation. It can also vary according to the broader context in which the organism is placed. I 
will now discuss the impact of these various procedural elements. 
Presentations of the CS-only and the US-only. Most research about changes in the 
CS-US relation focused on the impact of CS postexposure trials. These trials are presented 
after the CS-US trials and contain only the CS. Studies on Pavlovian conditioning typically 
show that a conditioned change in behavior can be reversed by presenting the CS on its own 
after the CS-US trials. Surprisingly, this phenomenon, which is known as extinction, has not 
been found in a number of EC studies (e.g., Baeyens, Crombez, Van den Bergh, & Eelen, 
1988; Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh, & Crombez, 1989a; De Houwer, Baeyens, 
Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 2000; Diaz, Ruiz, & Baeyens, 2005) even under conditions in 
which extinction of Pavlovian conditioning was observed (e.g., Vansteenwegen, Francken, 
Vervliet, De Clercq, & Eelen, 2006). Lipp, Oughton, and Lelievre (2003; also see Lipp & 
Purkis, 2006, and Blechert, Michael, Vriends, Margraf, & Wilhelm, 2007), on the other hand, 
did find evidence for extinction in EC when they measured CS liking during the extinction 
phase rather than only after the extinction phase. In a more recent study, however, Blechert,  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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Michael, Williams, Purkis, and Wilhelm (2008) failed to find extinction even when liking of 
the CSs was measured during the extinction phase. In sum, the available evidence suggests 
that CS-only trials have little effect on conditioned changes in liking.  
Only two studies have examined the effects of CS-only trials that are presented before 
the CS-US trials (De Houwer et al., 2000; Stuart, Shimp, & Engle, 1987). In both studies, 
CS-only trials seemed to interfere with EC, that is, with the effect of subsequent CS-US 
trials. This effect of CS preexposure trials is typically referred to as latent inhibition (e.g., 
Lubow & Gewirtz, 1995). Finally, there is one study that looked at the effects of US-only 
trials. In that study, Hammerl, Bloch, and Silverthorne (1997) found that US-only trials also 
delayed EC, both when presented before and after the CS-US trials. 
Occasion setting. In the studies discussed until now, the change in the CS-US relation 
occurred over time. A CS-US relation can, however, also depend on the physical context that 
is present (e.g., a second stimulus or the color of a room). In that case, the physical context 
can function as an occasion setter that signals when the CS-US relation holds. Baeyens and 
colleagues (Baeyens, Crombez, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1996a; Baeyens, Hendrickx, Crombez, 
& Hermans, 1998) studied occasion setting in EC by using the color of drinks as a signal for 
when a particular fruit flavor would be followed by a bad aftertaste. For instance, a fruit 
flavor was followed by the bad aftertaste only in green drinks but not in blue drinks. During a 
test phase in which none of the drinks had the bad aftertaste, drinks with the fruit flavor that 
was previously paired with the bad aftertaste were liked less than drinks with other flavor, 
regardless of the color of the drink. Hence, the studies of Baeyens and colleagues did not 
provide evidence to support the conclusion that conditioned changes in liking depend on the 
presence of the context in which the CS-US pairings were presented. Note that Hardwick and 
Lipp (2000) did observe occasion setting when using modulation of the startle response as an  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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index of learning. However, it has been argued that modulation of the startle responses does 
not provide a good index of evaluative conditioning because it can also be affected by factors 
other than the valence of the CSs (see below, section on the nature of the responses).   
The Concrete Implementation of the CS-US Relation 
The nature of the stimuli.  
The modality and semantic category of the CSs and USs. EC effects have been 
observed with a wide range of visual stimuli such as photographs of human faces as CSs and 
USs (e.g., Baeyens et al., 1992a), paintings as CSs and USs (Levey & Martin, 1975), outdoor 
sculptures as CSs and USs (e.g., Hammerl & Grabitz, 1996), nonsense words as CSs and 
valenced words as USs (e.g., Staats & Staats, 1957), cartoon characters as CSs and valenced 
words and photographs and USs (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2001), and names of fictitious products 
as CSs and valenced pictures as USs (e.g., Stuart et al., 1987; Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & 
Yzerbyt, 2007).  
  EC effects have also been found with non-visual stimuli. For instance, gustatory 
(taste) stimuli have been used as CSs (e.g., artificial fruit flavors) and USs (e.g., sugar or a 
chemical substance that produes a bad aftertaste; e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh, & 
Crombez, 1990a; Lamote, Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 2004; Zellner, Rozin, Aron, & 
Kulish, 1983). Olfactory (odor) stimuli have also been used successfully as USs (e.g., 
Hermans, Baeyens, Lamote, Spruyt, & Eelen, 2005; Todrank, Byrnes, Wrzesniewski, & 
Rozin, 1995) and as CSs and USs (e.g., Stevenson, Boakes, & Wilson, 2000). Other studies 
demonstrated EC with somatosensory stimuli such as the touch of objects as CSs and USs 
(e.g., Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000) or mild electric shocks as USs (e.g., Hermans, 
Vansteenwegen, Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2002). Auditory stimuli such as pieces of 
music have also been employed successfully as USs (e.g., Bierley, McSweeney, &  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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Vannnieuwkerk, 1985).  
  The valence and identity of the US. Although EC can be characterized as a general 
phenomenon that can involve many different kinds of stimuli, the available evidence suggests 
that properties of the stimuli do determine the magnitude and direction of EC. First and 
foremost, the valence of the US determines the direction of the change in valence of the CS. 
That is, a CS that is paired with a positively valenced US tends to become more positive 
whereas a CS that is paired with a negatively valenced US tends to become more negative 
(e.g., Baeyens et al., 1992a). The importance ofUS-valence rather than the specific identity of 
the US is also illustrated by the fact that EC is found not only when a CS is repeatedly paired 
with a single (positive or negative) US but also when it is paired with different USs that all 
share the same valence (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2001; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009). 
  There is less certainty about the effects of the extremity of the valence of the USs. On 
the one hand, Baeyens et al. (1988) found equally large effects with strongly valenced USs 
(e.g., mutilated faces) than with mildly valenced USs (e.g., disliked photographs of intact 
human faces). In a more recently reported study, Jones, Fazio, and Olson (in press) selected 
USs on the basis of a pilot study in which the valence of each US had to be determined as 
quickly as possible. USs that were classified quickly (and tended to be strongly valenced) 
resulted in smaller EC effects than USs that were classified slowly (and tended to be mildly 
valenced). Although more studies are needed to examine the impact of US extremity, the 
available evidence gives little reason to believe that more extreme USs lead to more extreme 
EC. If anything, the reverse seems to be true.  
There are some indications that positive USs are less effective than negative USs 
(e.g., Baeyens et al., 1990a). One explanation might be that positive USs tend to be less 
extremely valenced than negative USs. As we discussed in the previous paragraph, there is,  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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however, little evidence to support the idea that more extreme USs produce stronger EC. A 
second possible explanation is that people seem to differ more in their appreciation of 
potentially positive stimuli than in their liking of potentially negative stimuli (Peeters & 
Czapinski, 1990). This would result in more variability (and thus statistically smaller effects) 
when positive USs are used than when negative USs are used. Finally, organisms might be 
genetically prepared to learn more quickly about relations that involve negative stimuli than 
about relations that involve positive stimuli (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). More research is 
needed before definite conclusion regarding this issue can be reached.   
  Changes in the valence and identity of the US. Assume that a CS is paired with a 
positive US, and that this results in an increase in the liking of the CS. Research showed that 
when the positive US is afterwards made negative (e.g., by pairing it with negative stimuli), 
the CS will also become more negative. This finding is known as US-revaluation and has 
been observed in a number of studies (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990b; 
Walther, Gawronski, Blank, & Langer, 2009). It should be noted, however, that Baeyens, 
Vanhouche,  Crombez,  and Eelen (1998) failed to observe a US-revaluation effect in a study 
where artificial fruit flavors were used as CSs and a soap-like aftertaste was used as the US. 
They attributed this failure to the specific nature of their US. 
  In studies on US-revaluation, the identity of the US with which a CS is paired is kept 
stable whereas the valence of the US is changed. In studies on counterconditioning, both US 
identity andUS-valence are changed. For instance, after a CS has been paired with a 
positively valenced US, it is paired with a different US with a negative valence. Results have 
shown that the second pairing undoes and sometimes even reverses the change in liking that 
was produced (e.g., Baeyens et al., 1989a).  
  The intrinsic relation between CS and US. Apart from possible main effects of the  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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nature of the CS and the nature of the US, EC can also depend on the intrinsic relation 
between the CS and US, that is, the interaction of the nature of the CS and the nature of the 
US. For instance, Baeyens et al. (1990a) found that pairing the color of a drink with a bad 
aftertaste did not result in a change in liking of other drinks with that color whereas pairing 
the flavor of a drink with a bad aftertaste did change the liking of other drinks with that 
flavor. Hence, it seems that the relation between the color and the aftertaste has less effect on 
the liking of drinks that the relation between the flavor and the aftertaste. Likewise, Todrank 
et al. (1995) found that pairings of neutral photographs of human faces as CSs with odors as 
USs influenced the liking of the photographs only if the odors were “plausibly human” (e.g., 
sweat or fragrances). Such findings suggest that EC depends on the intrinsic relation between 
the CS and the US (see Garcia & Koelling, 1966, for similar finding in the context of other 
types of Pavlovian conditioning). 
  Researchers have also looked at the impact of the perceptual similarity between the 
CSs and USs. Martin and Levey (1978) found that EC was stronger for CSs that were paired 
with perceptually similar USs than for CSs that were paired with perceptually dissimilar USs. 
This effect was replicated by Field and Davey (1999) but shown to be an artifact in that it 
remained present even when the CS-US pairs were never presented. The artifact can arise 
when researchers select CSs on the basis of unreliable evaluative ratings that a participant 
gives at the start of the experiment. It is, for instance, possible that evaluative ratings of some 
CSs change simply as the result of seeing other stimuli that are used in the experiment. This 
is most likely to happen for CSs that resemble other positive or negative stimuli in the 
stimulus list (see Field & Davey, 1999, for more details). Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh, 
and Crombez (1989b) manipulated the perceptual similarity between the CS and US 
independently of the evaluative ratings of participants and failed to find stronger EC for  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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perceptually similar CS-US pairs. In sum, there is little evidence to support the conclusion 
that EC depends on the perceptual similarity between the CS and US. 
  The manner in which the CS and US are presented.  Once the stimuli have been 
selected, they need to be presented in a certain manner. This requires decisions about the time 
and location at which the stimuli occur, their size, luminance, and so on. Results suggest that 
EC effects become stronger the more the CS and US are presented in close temporal and 
spatial proximity (e.g., Jones et al., in press). Even though EC has been observed when the 
US always is presented before the CS (Martin & Levey, 1987; Stuart et al., 1987), effects in 
those situations appear to be weaker than when the presentation of the CS and US overlap or 
when the CS is presented briefly before the US. Finally, when using pictures as CSs and USs, 
Jones et al. (in press) recently found that EC effects increase in magnitude with increases in 
the size of the CSs.  
Nature of the evaluative response.  
What sets EC apart from other forms of Pavlovian conditioning is that it involves changes in 
evaluative responses, that is, responses that are assumed to reflect the liking of objects. Most 
often, changes in direct measures of liking are examined. Such direct measures require the 
participant to self-assess their liking of the CSs and USs, for instance, by selecting a number 
on a likert scale or by sorting the stimuli into separate piles for liked, neutral, or disliked 
pictures (e.g., Levey & Martin, 1975; Baeyens et al., 1992a). In more recent studies, indirect 
measures of liking have also been used, in which liking is inferred from performance during 
reaction time tasks (e.g., De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Hermans et al., 2002; 
Kerkhof et al., 2009; Mitchell, Anderson, & Lovibond, 2003), from physiological responses 
(e.g., Vansteenwegen, Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1998), and from neurological responses 
(e.g., Klucken et al., 2009). One should, however, be aware of the fact that a change in a  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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response can be labeled as EC only if it can be argued that the response is an evaluative 
response, that is, if it can be argued that the response provides an index of liking. For 
instance, some physiological responses such as skin conductance and modulation of the 
startle response seem to be determined by arousal level of stimuli rather than by the 
evaluative properties of stimuli and therefore do not qualify as indices of liking (e.g., 
Vansteenwegen et al., 1998). Nevertheless, the available evidence supports the conclusion 
that EC has been observed in a variety of evaluative responses. 
Nature of the organism that experiences the CS-US relation.  
Species. Many studies on EC have been conducted with human samples (see De 
Houwer et al., 2001, for a review). Some studies could be described as studies on EC in non-
human animals (e.g., Boakes, Albertella, & Harris, 2007; Capaldi, 1992; Delamater, 
Campese, LoLordo, & Sclafani, 2006). Unfortunately, the literature on human and nonhuman 
EC has developed independently, perhaps because it is not clear whether (the determinants 
of) evaluative responses in human and nonhumans are comparable.  
Societal status and age. Most studies on EC involved psychology students, but some 
studies involved children (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & De Houwer, 2001; Field, 2006; 
Fulcher, Mathews, & Hammerl, 2008) and community samples (e.g., Baeyens, 
Wrzesniewski, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1996). However, little is known about whether EC 
depends on the societal status or age of the participants.  
  Personality and mental disorders. Surprisingly few EC studies have taken into 
account the personality of the participants. One exception is a study by Baeyens et al. (1992a) 
who measured the “evaluative style” of their participants but failed to find differences in EC 
depending on whether participants were “feelers” or “thinkers”. We know of one study that 
compared EC in patients and healthy controls. In this study, Blechert et al. (2007) observed  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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that patients with poststraumatic stress disorder showed delayed extinction of EC compared 
to a healthy control group. This finding is somewhat puzzling given the fact that extinction of 
EC is rarely observed in groups of healthy participants (see above).  
Neurological and genetic properties. Neurological research on EC is still in its 
infancy. There have been two studies on the role of the amygdaloid nuclear complex (ANC), 
a structure that is critically involved in Pavlovian conditioning of fear responses. Whereas 
Johnsrude, Owen, White, Zhao, and Bohbot (2000), found impaired EC in individuals with 
unilateral damage to the ANC, Coppens et al. (2006) did find intact EC in these individuals. 
More research is thus needed to clarify the involvement of this and other brain regions in EC. 
To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies on the effects of the genetic make up of 
individuals or the use of chemical substances on EC.  
Nature of the context in which the relation is presented.  
Other tasks. A relation between stimuli cannot be presented in a vacuum but always 
occurs in a broader context in which other regularities are present. For instance, a particular 
CS-US relation can be present in a context in which participants are asked to fulfill certain 
tasks. Several studies confirm that tasks that are present briefly before or during the 
presentation of the CS-US relation can influence EC. Corneille, Yzerbyt, Pleyers, and 
Mussweiler (2009) recently found that EC effects were stronger when, briefly before the 
presentation of the CS-US pairs, participants were asked to detect similarities between 
various kinds of pictures compared to when their task was to detect differences between 
pictures. Tasks that are present during the presentation of the CS-US pairs also seem to be 
able to influence EC. Whereas some researchers found that the presence of an attention-
demanding task facilitates EC (e.g., Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001; Walther, 2002), others found 
that it reduces the size of EC (e.g., Field & Moore, 2005; Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt, &  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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Luminet, 2009). Finally, Baeyens, Eelen, and Van den Bergh (1990b) found that instructing 
participants to detect which CS goes together with which US did not influence the magnitude 
of EC. If anything, EC effects were smaller in the condition where participants were asked to 
discover the CS-US pairs. In sum, although it is clear that the broader context in which CS-
US pairs are presented does influence EC, it is not clear how other regularities in the 
environment (such as secondary tasks) affect EC.  
Other effects of the CS-US relation. The context in which a CS-US relation is 
presented consists not only of other contingencies and their effects on the organism, but also 
of other effects of that CS-US relation. This consideration leads to the question of whether 
the effects that a CS-US relation has on the liking of the CS (i.e., EC) are somehow related to 
other effects of that CS-US relation (e.g., effects on physiological responses or on conscious 
knowledge). Research on this question has focused mainly on effects of the CS-US relation 
on responses that can be seen as indices of awareness of the CS-US relation. The results of 
this research are, however, mixed. Some studies suggest that EC is independent of awareness 
of the CS-US relation (see De Houwer et al., 2001, and Field, 2005, for a review). For 
instance, Baeyens et al. (1990a; also see Dickinson & Brown, 2007, but see Wardle, Mitchell, 
& Lovibond, 2007) found that a contingency between a flavor and a bad aftertaste led to a 
change in liking of the flavor even though participants could not indicate which flavor was 
paired with the bad aftertaste. When, however, there was a relation between the color of the 
drinks and the bad aftertaste, participants were able to indicate which color was paired with 
the bad aftertaste, but they did not change their liking of the drinks with that color. A similar 
dissociation between EC and awareness of the CS-US relation was found by Fulcher and 
Hammerl (2001). They found that manipulations that increased awareness of the CS-US 
relations (e.g., instructions to detect the contingencies, blockwise presentations of the CS-US  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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pairs) actually decreased the magnitude of EC. In many other studies, however, a close link 
between awareness of the CS-US contingencies and EC has been observed. In a particularly 
convincing study, Pleyers et al. (2007) calculated for each participant the EC effect for CSs 
for which the participants could indicate the valence of the US with which it was paired and 
the EC effect for CSs for which participants did not remember the valence of the associated 
US. Significant EC occurred only for the former set of CSs. Similar results were found in 
several recent studies (e.g., Dawson, Rissling, Schell, & Wilcox, 2007; Stahl & Unkelbach, 
2008, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Corneille, in press; Wardle et al., 2007).  
Nature of the way in which the CS-US relation is communicated.  
In most EC studies, the CS and US stimuli are physically present and are thus experienced 
directly by the participants. However, a CS-US relation in the world can have an impact even 
when the organism does not experience the CS and US stimuli directly. First, EC can result 
also from observing other organisms that do directly experience the CS-US relation. In 
studies on observational EC, Baeyens et al. (1996) videotaped a child who drank little cups of 
water, some of which also contained a product that resulted in a bad, soap-like aftertaste. The 
model always displayed a negative facial expression after drinking cups of water with a bad 
aftertaste and a positive facial expression after drinking water that did not have the bad 
aftertaste. Other children watched the video while drinking cups of water simultaneously 
with the model. None of the drinks of the observers contained the bad aftertaste. Instead, each 
drink contained one of two neutral fruit flavors. The order of the drinks was arranged in such 
a way that the model always displayed a positive facial expression after the observers drank a 
cup of water with one flavor (e.g., apricot). When the observers drank water with the second 
flavor (e.g., lychee), the model always displayed a negative expression. Afterwards, the 
observers reported that they liked the first flavor better than the second one. One explanation  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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for this finding is that the facial expression of the model functioned as a US. From this 
perspective, the participants did experience the relation between the CS (flavor) and US 
(facial expression) directly. Another explanation is that the observers were influenced by how 
the model reacted to the relation between the CS (flavor) and US (bad aftertaste of the drink).  
  A second way of presenting information about CS-US relations indirectly is by giving 
verbal instructions. For instance, Gregg, Seibt, and Banaji (2006) told some participants that 
members of a fictitious social group called “Niffites” generally behaved in a positive manner 
whereas members of a different fictitious social group called “Luupites” generally behaved in 
a negative manner. Simply providing this information was sufficient to create a preference 
for Niffites compared to Luupites, regardless of whether liking was measured using rating 
scales or derived from performance in a reaction time task. In a related study, De Houwer 
(2006) told participants the names of Niffites would be paired with positive stimuli whereas 
names of Luupites would be paired with negative stimuli (or vice versa). Even though the 
stimuli were never actually presented, a reaction time measure of liking (i.e., the Implicit 
Association Test) showed that participants did like the Niffites names better than the 
Luupites names. Although there have been few studies that directly compare the effects of 
direct experiences of CS-US relations with the effects of verbal information about the same 
CS-US relations, the available evidence does allow for the conclusion that both ways of 
presenting information can lead to EC.  
Mental Process Theories 
  Until now we have considered only the impact of elements of the procedure on EC. 
Our review shows that a lot can be learned about the determinants of EC at this level of 
explanation. In this section, we will try to explain this procedure knowledge by describing 
mental processes that might underlie EC. The aim of these process theories is to explain how  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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the pairing of stimuli can lead to changes in liking and why these changes depend on the 
nature of the procedure.  
The Conceptual-Categorization Account 
According to Davey (1994), the pairing of a CS and a US can result in a change in the 
liking of the CS because it makes salient those features of the CS that it has in common with 
the US. For example, assume that an evaluatively neutral face has the features of brown eyes, 
long shape, full lips and long hair. Also assume that this neutral face is repeatedly presented 
together with a liked US that has the features of blue eyes, round shape, full lips, and long 
hair. The CS-US pairings are assumed to increase the salience of the features that the CS has 
in common with the US, being, full lips and long hair. As a result, the CS is more likely to be 
categorized as a liked stimulus. Note that this explanation of EC does not refer to the 
existence of associations in memory but does attribute EC to the CS-US pairings.  
  The model of Davey (1994) correctly predicts that EC should depend mainly on the 
number of co-occurrences of the CS and US because it is on these trials that the salience of 
the CS features can change. Once the salience of certain CS features has been increased, 
these changes in salience (and thus liking) might persist even when the CS or US are 
subsequently presented on their own. However, the model has difficulties explaining a 
number of other findings. First, EC has been found even when the CS and US belong to 
different modalities and therefore do not have features in common. Second, the model cannot 
explain the fact that revaluation of a particular US after the CS-US pairings influences the 
liking of the CS with which it was paired but not the liking of other CSs (Baeyens et al., 
1992b; Walther et al., 2009). US-revaluation might influence the nature of the features that a 
participant regards as typical for liked or disliked stimuli. This should, however, influence 
the liking of all CSs, not only the CS that was paired with that specific US. Third, the model  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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does not provide an explanation for how merely instructing participants about a CS-US 
relation can result in EC.  
The Holistic Account 
Martin and Levey (1978, 1994; Levey & Martin, 1975) postulated that the co-occurrence of a 
CS and a US automatically results in the formation of a holistic representation that encodes 
stimulus elements of both the CS and US, as well as the valence of the US. Once the holistic 
representation has been formed, the CS can activate this representation and thus the 
evaluation that was associated with the US.  
The holistic model correctly predicts that conditioned changes in liking should 
depend mainly on CS-US co-occurrences because these trials result in the formation of the 
holistic representation. Subsequent CS-only trials should not alter the holistic representation 
and thus should also not influence the conditioned change in liking. Hence, the model is in 
line with those studies that failed to find extinction of EC. The model can explain the effect 
of US-revaluation if it is assumed that the US can activate the holistic representation on the 
US-revaluation trials and if the new valence of the US can be integrated in the holistic 
representation. The holistic account also predicts that EC can occur in the absence of 
awareness. Some argue, however, that unconscious EC has still not been demonstrated 
conclusively (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Dawson et al., 2007). The model cannot 
explain that, in many cases, EC does occur only when participants are aware of the CS-US 
contingencies (e.g., Pleyers et al., 2007). It also fails to provide an account of how EC can 
occur on the basis of instructions, in the absence of any CS-US pairings. 
The Misattribution Account 
Recently, Jones et al. (in press) proposed a misattribution theory according to which the 
evaluative reaction that is evoked by the US can be become associated with the CS on trials  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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where the CS and US co-occur. In line with early behaviorist theories of conditioning (e.g., 
Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 1913), it is assumed that these S-R associations can be formed in 
the absence of awareness of the CS-US relation. Jones et al. do postulate, however, that the 
formation of an S-R association depends on what they call an “implicit misattribution” of the 
evaluative response to the CS. That is, participants need to (incorrectly) assume that the 
evaluation that they experience is caused by the CS rather than by the US. This misattribution 
can occur implicitly in that it does not depend on a conscious evaluation of the CS or US. 
Nevertheless, any variable that influences the likelihood that the US-valence is misattributed 
to the CS should influence EC. Jones et al. indeed observed an impact of a number of these 
variables, including the size of the CS (feelings are more likely to be attributed to large and 
thus salient CSs) and spatial proximity (feelings are more likely to be attributed to CSs that 
are close to a US). However, such effects could be explained also without invoking the 
assumption that EC depends on a misattribution of the evaluation that is evoked by the US 
(e.g., CS size and CS-US proximity could as such influence the formation of CS-US 
associations).  
The most striking support for the misattribution theory, however, comes from the 
finding that mildly valenced USs result in stronger EC effects than strongly valenced USs. 
Jones et al. (in press) explain this finding by assuming that the feeling evoked by strongly 
valenced USs is more likely to be correctly attributed to the US and thus less likely to be 
misattributed to the CS. However, the effect that Jones et al. observed was small (i.e., only 
marginally significant despite a large sample) and present only in participants who were 
classified as unaware. Moreover, Baeyens et al. (1988) failed to find an effect of US 
extremity. More research on this topic is clearly needed.  
The misattribution theory cannot explain the effects of US-revaluation on EC because  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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the representation that is assumed to underlie EC does not contain information about the 
stimulus properties of the US. Because of this, the US cannot activate the CS representation 
during the revaluation trials. The model can also not explain EC in the absence of CS-US co-
occurrences, such as with indirect CS-US relations (i.e., sensory preconditioning) or EC as 
the result of instructions.  
The Referential Account 
Baeyens et al. (1992b; Baeyens & De Houwer, 1995) postulated that there are two types of 
learning. The first type concerns the learning of predictive relations by which the CS 
becomes a signal for the upcoming presentation of the US. This type of signal learning is 
assumed to underlie most cases of Pavlovian conditioning, that is, most effects of the pairing 
of stimuli (also see Rescorla, 1988). The second type concerns the learning of referential 
relations by which the CS becomes a stimulus that simply refers to (i.e., makes one think of) 
the US without becoming a signal for the actual presentation of the US. EC is assumed to 
depend on the second type of learning. Whereas Baeyens et al. (1992b) seemed to assume 
that the two types of learning actually depend on the formation of different types of CS-US 
associations in memory, De Houwer (1998; De Houwer et al., 2001) suggested that signal 
and referential learning depend on a single learning mechanism that produces only one type 
of CS-US associations. According to De Houwer, signal and referential learning differ 
because the CS-US associations have a different effect on preparatory responses than on 
evaluative responses.  
  Because referential learning is thought to be driven by the co-occurrence of stimuli, 
the referential model can explain why EC seems to be resistant to extinction (i.e., impervious 
to the effects of CS-only trials that are presented after CS-US trials). The redundancy of the 
CS-US relation should also not have an effect. Moreover, the model can explain the presence  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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of US-revaluation effects because the change in liking of the US is assumed to be mediated 
by the activation of the US representation. Changing this representation during the US-
revaluation trials should thus also affect the liking of the CS. Just like the holistic and the 
misattribution accounts, the referential account postulates that referential learning is 
independent of awareness of CS-US contingencies and should thus occur also in the absence 
of contingency awareness. However, the evidence on unaware EC is still inconclusive. 
Moreover, at least in certain cases, there does seem to be a close link between EC and 
contingency awareness (e.g., Pleyers et al., 2007). Finally, because association formation is 
assumed to be a gradual process that is driven by the actual presence of stimuli, it is difficult 
to see how the referential model can explain EC as the result of instructions.  
The Propositional Account 
De Houwer (2007; De Houwer, Baeyens, & Field, 2005) put forward the suggestion that EC, 
like all other forms of conditioning (see De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009a), might 
result from the formation of propositions about the CS-US relation. According to this 
propositional account, the liking of the CS will change only after participants have formed 
the conscious proposition that the CS is paired with a valenced US. Although the model does 
not always explain how this propositional knowledge results in a change in liking (see 
Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009b), it does postulate that the formation of a 
proposition about the CS-US relation is a necessary mediating step. One possible way in 
which propositions can influence liking is that participants use propositional knowledge 
about the CS-US relation as a justification for determining how much they like the CS. For 
instance, the fact that a CS is paired with a negative US can be seen as a justification for 
disliking the CS (De Houwer et al., 2005). 
  Because the formation of propositions is a conscious and effortful process, the  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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propositional account predicts that EC should depend on awareness of the CS-US relation. It 
would thus not be able to account for convincing evidence for unaware EC. The model also 
predicts that other tasks that direct attention away from the CS-US pairings should hamper 
EC. The evidence on this issue is mixed (e.g., Hammerl & Fulcher, 2001; Pleyers et al., 
2009). Although the propositional model does not make strong predictions about the 
statistical properties of the CS-US relation that determine EC, it is compatible with the 
observation that EC is driven primarily by co-occurrences of the CS and US (i.e., that 
contiguity rather than contingency seems to matter). Co-occurrences would be primary in 
those cases where EC depends not on the formation of propositions about the statistical 
contingency between the CS and US but on the formation of propositions about the co-
occurrence of the CS and US. Because EC is assumed to depend on knowledge about the US, 
revaluation of the US should influence EC. Finally, because propositional knowledge can 
result either from experience or from instructions, the model can account for EC as the result 
of instructions.  
Conclusions 
The research on EC that we reviewed in this chapter clearly shows that the pairing of 
stimuli can lead to changes in liking of those stimuli. We have also learned that EC is a 
general phenomenon that occurs with many different stimuli, influences many types of 
evaluative responses, can be found in many different organisms and contexts, and can result 
both from experience, observation, and instruction. We have also learned that EC seems to be 
driven mostly by the co-occurrence of the CS and the US whereas contingency and 
redundancy seem to be less important. Nevertheless, there are still many uncertainties about 
the conditions under which EC occurs and the mental processes that underlie EC. First, 
although EC is a general phenomenon, there have also been genuine failures to find EC (e.g.,  Evaluative  Conditioning 
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Rozin, Wrzesniewski, &  Byrnes, 1998). This suggests that there are subtle but important 
boundary conditions that need to be fulfilled before the pairing of stimuli results in a change 
in liking. Second, the literature on EC is characterized by many conflicting results, including 
on important topics such as the relation between EC and awareness of the CS-US 
contingencies, the impact of US-revaluation, the impact of CS postexposure trials (i.e., 
extinction), the impact of other tasks that direct attention toward or away from the CS-US 
contingencies, and the relation between EC effects that are due to experience versus 
instructions. Because of these conflicting results, progress regarding our understanding of the 
mental processes that underlie EC has been limited. Different theories make different 
predictions regarding the role of contingency awareness, US-revaluation, extinction, 
attention, and instructions, but the conflicting results interferes with the selection between or 
refinement of these theories.  
As was suggested by De Houwer et al. (2005; De Houwer, 2007), it is possible that 
EC effects can be due to different mental processes. The conflicting results in the literature 
could thus be due to the fact that different processes underlie EC in the different studies. For 
instance, it is possible that when EC is caused by propositional processes, it will depend on 
awareness, US-revaluation, CS postexposures, attention, and instructions.  In cases where EC 
is independent from contingency awareness, US-revaluation, CS postexposures, attention, or 
instructions, it might be due to more automatic processes such as the formation of holistic 
representations. As argued by De Houwer (2007), an important task for future research on EC 
should thus be to uncover the variables that determine the properties of EC, that is, whether 
EC depends on awareness, US-revaluation, CS postexposures, attention, or instructions. Such 
an approach can lead to new insights in the important phenomenon of evaluative 
conditioning.   Evaluative  Conditioning 
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